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2017


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Strategy selection as rational metareasoning

Lieder, F., Griffiths, T. L.

Psychological Review, 124, pages: 762-794, American Psychological Association, November 2017 (article)

Abstract
Many contemporary accounts of human reasoning assume that the mind is equipped with multiple heuristics that could be deployed to perform a given task. This raises the question of how the mind determines when to use which heuristic. To answer this question, we developed a rational model of strategy selection, based on the theory of rational metareasoning developed in the artificial intelligence literature. According to our model people learn to efficiently choose the strategy with the best cost–benefit tradeoff by learning a predictive model of each strategy’s performance. We found that our model can provide a unifying explanation for classic findings from domains ranging from decision-making to arithmetic by capturing the variability of people’s strategy choices, their dependence on task and context, and their development over time. Systematic model comparisons supported our theory, and 4 new experiments confirmed its distinctive predictions. Our findings suggest that people gradually learn to make increasingly more rational use of fallible heuristics. This perspective reconciles the 2 poles of the debate about human rationality by integrating heuristics and biases with learning and rationality. (APA PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)

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DOI Project Page [BibTex]

2017


DOI Project Page [BibTex]


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Empirical Evidence for Resource-Rational Anchoring and Adjustment

Lieder, F., Griffiths, T. L., Huys, Q. J. M., Goodman, N. D.

Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review, 25, pages: 775-784, Springer, May 2017 (article)

Abstract
People’s estimates of numerical quantities are systematically biased towards their initial guess. This anchoring bias is usually interpreted as sign of human irrationality, but it has recently been suggested that the anchoring bias instead results from people’s rational use of their finite time and limited cognitive resources. If this were true, then adjustment should decrease with the relative cost of time. To test this hypothesis, we designed a new numerical estimation paradigm that controls people’s knowledge and varies the cost of time and error independently while allowing people to invest as much or as little time and effort into refining their estimate as they wish. Two experiments confirmed the prediction that adjustment decreases with time cost but increases with error cost regardless of whether the anchor was self-generated or provided. These results support the hypothesis that people rationally adapt their number of adjustments to achieve a near-optimal speed-accuracy tradeoff. This suggests that the anchoring bias might be a signature of the rational use of finite time and limited cognitive resources rather than a sign of human irrationality.

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link (url) DOI [BibTex]

link (url) DOI [BibTex]


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A computerized training program for teaching people how to plan better

Lieder, F., Krueger, P. M., Callaway, F., Griffiths, T. L.

PsyArXiv, 2017 (article)

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Project Page [BibTex]

Project Page [BibTex]


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Toward a rational and mechanistic account of mental effort

Shenhav, A., Musslick, S., Lieder, F., Kool, W., Griffiths, T., Cohen, J., Botvinick, M.

Annual Review of Neuroscience, 40, pages: 99-124, Annual Reviews, 2017 (article)

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Project Page [BibTex]

Project Page [BibTex]


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The anchoring bias reflects rational use of cognitive resources

Lieder, F., Griffiths, T. L., Huys, Q. J. M., Goodman, N. D.

Psychonomic Bulletin \& Review, 25, pages: 762-794, Springer, 2017 (article)

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[BibTex]

[BibTex]

2015


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Efficient Dense Rigid-Body Motion Segmentation and Estimation in RGB-D Video

Stueckler, J., Behnke, S.

International Journal of Computer Vision (IJCV), 113(3):233-245, 2015 (article)

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link (url) DOI [BibTex]

2015


link (url) DOI [BibTex]


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Model-Based Strategy Selection Learning

Lieder, F., Griffiths, T. L.

The 2nd Multidisciplinary Conference on Reinforcement Learning and Decision Making, 2015 (article)

Abstract
Humans possess a repertoire of decision strategies. This raises the question how we decide how to decide. Behavioral experiments suggest that the answer includes metacognitive reinforcement learning: rewards reinforce not only our behavior but also the cognitive processes that lead to it. Previous theories of strategy selection, namely SSL and RELACS, assumed that model-free reinforcement learning identifies the cognitive strategy that works best on average across all problems in the environment. Here we explore the alternative: model-based reinforcement learning about how the differential effectiveness of cognitive strategies depends on the features of individual problems. Our theory posits that people learn a predictive model of each strategy’s accuracy and execution time and choose strategies according to their predicted speed-accuracy tradeoff for the problem to be solved. We evaluate our theory against previous accounts by fitting published data on multi-attribute decision making, conducting a novel experiment, and demonstrating that our theory can account for people’s adaptive flexibility in risky choice. We find that while SSL and RELACS are sufficient to explain people’s ability to adapt to a homogeneous environment in which all decision problems are of the same type, model-based strategy selection learning can also explain people’s ability to adapt to heterogeneous environments and flexibly switch to a different decision-strategy when the situation changes.

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link (url) Project Page [BibTex]

link (url) Project Page [BibTex]


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The optimism bias may support rational action

Lieder, F., Goel, S., Kwan, R., Griffiths, T. L.

NIPS 2015 Workshop on Bounded Optimality and Rational Metareasoning, 2015 (article)

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[BibTex]

[BibTex]


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Rational use of cognitive resources: Levels of analysis between the computational and the algorithmic

Griffiths, T. L., Lieder, F., Goodman, N. D.

Topics in Cognitive Science, 7(2):217-229, Wiley, 2015 (article)

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[BibTex]

[BibTex]